Publication

Universally Utility-Maximizing Privacy Mechanisms

Source:

ACM Symposium on Theory of Computer Science (STOC) 2009 (2009)

Abstract:

A mechanism for releasing information about a statistical database with sensitive data must resolve a trade-off between utility and privacy. Informally, publishing fully accurate information maximizes utility while minimizing privacy, while publishing random noise accomplishes the opposite. Formally, privacy can be rigorously quantified using the framework of differential privacy, which requires that a mechanism's output distribution is nearly the same (in a strong sense) whether or not a given database row is included or excluded. Thus far, (dis)utility has typically been quantified via the expected error of a (randomly perturbed) response to a query. In this paper, we pursue much stronger and more general utility guarantees. Just as differential privacy guarantees protection against every potential attacker, independent of its side information, we seek a mechanism that guarantees near-optimal utility to every potential user, independent of its side information. Formally, we model the side information of a potential user as a prior distribution over query results. An interaction between such a user and a mechanism induces a posterior distribution -- the utility of the mechanism for this user is defined as the accuracy of this posterior as quantified via a user-specific loss function. A differentially private mechanism M is (near-)optimal for a given user u if u derives (almost) as much utility from M as from any other differentially private mechanism. We prove that for each fixed counting query and differential privacy level, there is a geometric mechanism M* — a discrete variant of the well-studied Laplace mechanism — that is simultaneously utility-maximizing for every possible user, subject to the differential privacy constraint. This is an extremely strong utility guarantee: every potential user u, no matter what its side information and loss function, derives as much utility from M* as from interacting with a differentially private mechanism Mu that is optimally tailored to u. The first part of our proof characterizes the utility-maximizing differentially private mechanism for a fixed but arbitrary user in terms of a basic feasible solution to a linear program with constraints that encode differential privacy. The second part shows that all of the relevant vertices of this polytope (ranging over all possible users) are derivable from the geometric mechanism via suitable remappings of its range.